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Introduction: From Terri Schiavo to Chelsea Manning
As Foucault demonstrates in The Archaeology of  Knowledge, the carving up 
of  history is an arbitrary process. With this in mind, I want to bookend 
a recent and ongoing history with reference to two figures, Terri Schiavo 
and Chelsea Manning. These are individuals that, it might be argued, play 
significant symbolic roles in defining the shifting stakes of  Western bio-
politics in the opening decades of  the twenty-first century. The intention 
here is to set the scene for rethinking the anatomo-political in relation to 
the biopolitical.
Terri Schiavo spent 15 years in a coma following cardiac arrest as a 
result of  a long term eating disorder. Her family fought to have her feed-
ing tube removed but faced high level opposition from senior U.S. politi-
cians including the then president George W. Bush. They finally won their 
case to terminate life support in 2005. As Slavoj Žižek suggested at the 
time, the affirmation of  an ethico-legal duty to maintain a life at all costs, 
even when this life had arguably been reduced to the living death of  ir-
reversible coma, came at a time when other ‘living deaths’ secured the 
detention of  those the bombs missed in Guantanamo.1 What the case of  Terri 
Schiavo demonstrated was the persistence of  a rhetoric which identified 
life as sacred, a rhetoric which should have rung hollow in light of  the 
military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, the juxtaposi-
tion of  such events – the domestic versus the international - highlighted 
not only the complexities of  contemporary biopolitics understood as the 
positioning of  life, human life, as the ultimate value to protect and en-
hance but also highlighted the multiple ways in which such a positioning 
might flip over into what Giorgio Agamben refers to as a thanatopolitics 
1 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Biopolitics: Between Terri Schiavo and Guantanamo’, ArtForum 
(December 2005).
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which exposes the sovereign core of  the biopolitical. This is clearly more 
complex than simply pitting one life or set of  lives against another, which 
constitutes the justification for the reemergence of  a sovereign ‘right to 
kill’ within biopolitics in the form of  racism, which Foucault identifies at 
the end of  Society Must Be Defended. Following Butler’s notion of  grievable 
life, what is at stake is the ‘values’ associated with a certain set of  lives as 
well as the reduction of  the lives of  ‘others’ to perceived values at odds 
with our own.
In July 2013, Chelsea Manning, born Bradley Edward Manning was 
convicted of  violations of  the Espionage Act for leaking documents 
whilst in the U.S. army. Having been tried as Bradley, Manning issued a 
statement on sentencing that she wished to live as a woman. Although, 
the issue of  Manning’s gender had been introduced in court as testimony, 
what does the very specific wish to serve out a military prison sentence 
as a woman, or pre-op transsexual, rather than a man tell us about the 
conditions within this carceral space and, moreover, the way such a space 
is structured and organized according to certain gender norms? At the 
same time, why did Private Bradley Manning only fully identify his/herself  
as ‘Chelsea’ at sentencing? What does this tell us about the performance 
of  gender within the military and, moreover, during a high profile court 
case? The transgressive act of  whistleblowing and perceived betrayal of  
the security of  his country bound up with this act can be mapped far too 
easily onto the ‘transgressive’ body of  Chelsea Manning. To some degree, 
Manning has become symbolic in various senses of  the complexities and 
hypocrisies of  Western democracy along with notions of  truth and free-
dom such democracy claims to promote and protect. The focus of  this 
paper, however, has less to do with Manning as symbol of  such paradoxes 
but, rather, the specific material conditions of  her incarceration and, I 
want to suggest, any and all incarceration. Manning is facing a maximum 
of  35 years in military prison and a minimum of  8 years.
This paper is an attempt to think beyond notions of  the exceptional, 
the supra-legal, beyond the bare life, the precarious life, the indefinitely 
suspended life which have dominated discussions on incarceration and 
detention since 911. In particular, I want to consider how Butler has 
developed a critical stance which, in focusing on the exceptional, risks 
disregarding the everyday. At stake, therefore, is Manning in her cell not 
Schiavo on her drip. 
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In the aftermath of  911, much of  the intellectual left in the U.S. and 
Europe was forced to re-evaluate its position together with its role in both 
speaking out against and usefully conceptualizing the parameters and im-
plications of  the so-called ‘war on terror’ as well as the discourses and rep-
resentations which underpinned and framed it. Looking here at Butler’s 
particular, and arguably highly personal, response in Precarious Life and 
subsequently, in Frames of  War, a series of  tensions emerge which are as 
important for thinking through the role of  the public intellectual as they 
are for articulating the current socio-political terms defining society in 
the U.S. and elsewhere in the West. Where Butler draws extensively on 
Foucault’s work on governmentality in her explorations of  the extra-legal 
activities of  the U.S. government and military, how might we shift the 
focus from abstracted discussions of  the law and detention, to the real, 
everyday, material conditions of  life in incarceration? Moreover, without 
denying the importance of  ongoing critical debates about the treatment 
of  terror suspects, the outsourcing of  torture and the perpetual state of  
exception endorsing a permanent war industry, how might we return our 
attention to the status quo maintained by such exceptions – the institutional 
spaces which continue to affirm a disciplinary mode of  power?
Reflecting on both the various responses and various possible respons-
es to 911 open to those working in U.S. academia in the immediate after-
math, in Precarious Life, Butler considers the statement made by a friend/
colleague that the collapse of  the Twin Towers marked the ‘end of  first 
world complacency.’2 Where do we go from this observation? Butler sug-
gested that instead of  attempting to ‘heal’ such a wound and restore such 
complacency which can only ever really entail what we have indeed seen 
happen over the past decade or so, the ‘more or less permanent war’ and 
‘the dry grief  of  political rage,’3 there is the possibility of  something dif-
ferent here. What is needed is to put an end to the ‘endless cycle of  re-
venge.’ Thus, instead of  lamenting the loss of  such complacency, Butler 
suggests allowing it to stand in order to ‘begin to build a different politics 
on its basis?’4
2 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of  Mourning and Violence (London and New 
York, NY: Verso, 2004), p. 8.
3 Ibid., p. xix.
4 Ibid., p. 8.
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If  retrospectively, the hope for a radical reconfiguration of  U.S. inter-
national relations seems naïve at best, this is not where I take issue with 
Butler. Rather, it is in the distinction she establishes between the inner 
space of  the U.S. and the rest of  the world. Such a distinction risks reaf-
firming a sense of  first world superiority, if  not complacency in the very 
act of  acknowledging its loss or disappearance. It repeats the gesture of  
Michael Moore’s Farenheit 911 in assuming a predominantly U.S. audience 
rather than a wider reception. Moreover, in claiming that previously ‘the 
only violence we knew was the kind we inflicted on ourselves’,5 Butler 
is not only presenting a universalized image of  the U.S. via the notion 
of  shared suffering but seems to dismiss the systemic violence, suffering 
and social inequality which operates within the U.S. If  911 demonstrated 
anything, it was the need to bring the age of  the world picture to a close. 
Consequently, Butler’s call for a rethinking of  politics must also be applied 
to the domestic as well as the international. It is not simply a question of  
how one relates to the ‘other’ perceived as foreign threat from without 
but how relations within a nation state are configured through its internal, 
social institutions and spaces. 
My aim here is to think specifically about one such regular, disciplin-
ary space. The prison or penitentiary. In addition, to demanding that we 
examine Foucault’s work on discipline, anatomo-politics and the prison 
afresh, I want to give further attention to the notion of  representation 
as it applies to the carceral space. There are a series of  critical conjunc-
tions which bring Foucault and Butler together again in potentially use-
ful ways. 
Running throughout the essay will be a reflection on how one negoti-
ates one’s position as an academic responding to such events as well as 
the potential for a more active rather than purely reactive stance here. In 
this respect, it might be helpful to juxtapose the tensions experienced by 
Foucault and other intellectuals during their work as part of  the Groupe 
d’Information sur les prisons [Prisons Information Group] during the early 1970s. 
Not only does this have specific relevance to the discussion of  the prison 
and life in incarceration but very important questions are raised both by 
the group themselves and others during and after the enquiries they car-
ried out as to the nature and degree of  involvement academics might have 
in the analysis and critique of  such spaces.
5 Ibid., p. 39.
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Real Bodies in Real Spaces?
In Bodies that Matter, Butler appears to have two main objectives – the 
first is to take stock of  which bodies matter and which bodies don’t with 
the aim of  redressing the hierarchies which privilege the rights and needs 
of  certain bodies above others. The second is to provide a certain revi-
sion or, if  you prefer, renegotiation of  some of  the positions assumed in 
Gender Trouble particularly those which led to confusion. Both objectives 
are predicated upon a rethinking of  the ‘material’ body, the body as matter 
as something that matters. A similar set of  objectives structure what fol-
lows. The bodies in question are both different and the same as Butler’s 
‘bodies’ in that no body can ever coincide with its physical, political or 
conceptual renderings yet instead might be defined by its potential, a po-
tential all bodies possess to exceed and subvert existing presentations and 
representations. At the same time, such potential is at risk of  exhausting 
itself  in its own posturing and rhetoric or, indeed, succeeds so convinc-
ingly that all that remains is imitation and recuperation as it is co-opted by 
the prevailing hegemony. 
Nevertheless, of  interest here is not so much the body’s, any body’s, 
potential for subversion of  gender norms and categories, but rather, the 
way in which the body which has already been cast as dangerously sub-
versive, the criminal body, continues to attest to a certain modality of  
disciplinary power which affirms subjectivisation as the production of  the 
subject qua subject. Moreover, in emphasizing the persistence of  ‘disci-
plinary’ power here, the aim is also to indicate how such power continues 
to crystallize within certain institutional spaces, their architecture and in-
frastructures in a very material way. This requires returning to the body 
that Butler explores in Bodies that Matter. Like Butler, my intention is not to 
offer biological determinations of  the body but, rather, to consider how 
such determinations are produced within different frameworks of  power. 
To do so, I will argue, involves acknowledging rather than disregarding 
the effects of  such institutional spaces precisely at a moment where they 
seem to have been discounted or written off. Such spaces, the prison, the 
hospital but also the school and workplace continue to require certain 
normalizing techniques that appear out of  sync with neoliberal-inflected 
modes of  self-promotion, surveillance and management.
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Foucault’s claim made in an interview in 1978 that ‘in the future we 
need to distance ourselves from today’s disciplinary society’,6 should not 
be read as a simple indictment of  institutional forms of  power but, rath-
er, a call to pay attention to different, emerging forms of  power. One of  
Agamben’s most well-known criticisms of  Foucault, made in Homo Sacer, 
is that he fails to analyse the relationship between sovereign and biopower 
or attempt to identify a point of  intersection between the two discourses.7 
Both Discipline and Punish and The Will to Knowledge present power in terms 
of  a fundamental shift from one form to another. However, following Dan 
Beer’s account of  Foucault’s very specific rhetoric and the deliberate struc-
tural techniques he sets up in his written texts, we should acknowledge the 
intentional, over-emphasis put on the contrast between the two models of  
power in these texts.8 This becomes clear in the light of  a more nuanced ac-
count of  the changing modalities of  power, which Foucault provides in his 
Collège de France lectures. Thus, in his 1973 lecture series, Psychiatric Power, 
he identifies elements of  disciplinary (anatomopolitical) power which came 
into existence within the mechanisms of  sovereign power: 
Disciplinary apparatuses come from far back; for a long time they were 
anchored and functioned in the midst of  sovereignty; they formed like islands 
where a type of  power was exercised which was very different from what could 
be called the period’s general morphology of  sovereignty.9
Here, he also provides a detailed account of  how the family unit, as-
sociated with the exercise of  sovereign power via the forbidding figure 
of  the father, came to provide the model for the asylum, which Foucault 
declares an essentially disciplinary institution. However, Foucault also in-
sists that the notion of  the family is evoked in psychiatric power not as 
a residue from old discourses of  sovereign power but is actually gains an 
increasingly fundamental role within psychiatric techniques for regulating 
and managing the ‘sick’ or ‘deviant’ body:
6 Michel Foucault, ‘La société disciplinaire en crise’, in Dits et écrits II: 1976-88 (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2001), pp. 532-534 (my translation).
7 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1998).
8 Dan Beer, Michel Foucault: Form and Power (Oxford: Legenda, 2002).
9 Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-73 (New 
York, NY: Palgrave, 2008), p. 63.
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Inasmuch as the family conforms to the non-disciplinary schema of  an ap-
paratus (dispositif) of  sovereignty, I think we could say that it is the hinge, the 
interlocking point, which is absolutely indispensable to the very functioning of  
all the disciplinary systems. I mean that the family is the instance of  constraint 
that will permanently fix individuals to their disciplinary apparatuses (appareils), 
which will inject them, so to speak, into the disciplinary apparatuses (appareils).10
The same reading needs to be applied today in thinking about the rela-
tionship between the sovereign, the disciplinary and security. Disciplinary 
techniques which defined the nineteenth century factory, school, hospital 
and prison, continue to supplement and underpin more contemporary 
manifestations of  power aimed at the organization, management and con-
trol of  populations. 
In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault introduces the notion of ‘se-
curity’, a term he doesn’t explore elsewhere, in order to further articulate 
the two-fold (bi-polar) operation of  bio-power as it targets both individu-
als and populations defined via a ‘political technology of  life’.11 In taking 
as its aim the population at large, security is defined by Foucault in terms 
of  the supplement it offers to disciplinary power which focuses on the 
individual body. Together they make up modern biopower. Where sover-
eign power involves coercion and violence and disciplinary power is com-
prised of  techniques of  regulation and normalization, security operates 
according to a principle of  circulation. Unlike disciplinary power which 
seeks to contain and limit, security is, instead, concerned with growth and 
production, and the increase of  its mechanisms. Where disciplinary power 
is centripetal, security is a centrifugal force operating within and beyond 
society.12 This is why, unlike sovereign power, security does not target fixed 
territories. Rather, it is aimed at populations whose sizes, configurations 
and locations are in constant flux. According to Foucault, security can be 
linked to the emergence of  capitalism. Security provides the possibility 
for economic growth by simultaneously encouraging and restricting the 
circulation of  goods, opening up borders and delineating new boundaries. 
Recent critical theory on the body tends to assume one of  two po-
sitions. On the one hand, much theoretical discourse is taken up with 
10 Ibid., p. 81.
11 Michel Foucault, The History of  Sexuality I (New York, NY: Vintage, 1990), p. 145.
12 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78 
(New York, NY: Palgrave, 2009), pp. 44-45.
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considerations of  the ‘post-human’ body found in the work of  Donna 
Haraway and numerous disciples of  Deleuze and Guattari. The post-
human body is the utopian/dystopian body. On the one hand, we have 
the depoliticised body – representing a utopian, affirmation of  a BwO 
(BodyWithoutOrgans) – the body as a series of  flows or an assemblage 
which exceeds limitations of  the physical, fleshly body, calling into ques-
tion ideas about gender, sexuality, desire and so on. The flipside of  this 
takes on a dystopian dimension which is epitomised by the shift from 
disciplinary society to Deleuze’s ‘control society’. Bodies are no longer 
organised in institutional spaces but subjectivity has been reduced to dif-
ferent types of  data. We have become a series of  passwords, pin numbers, 
usernames and barcodes. The second position, and this is where we might 
to some extent locate Butler’s recent work, takes as its focus the bare life 
of  the non-western victim who has become the poster boy or girl of  
Western human rights discourses. In other words, the suffering, tortured 
body which has been stripped of  all identity, citizenship and culture.
However, underpinning both these positions are a set of  biopoliti-
cal assumptions which continue to posit life as societies’ ultimate goal or 
value above all other values. Moreover, any attempt to think our bodies 
without our bodies – invariably fails and, as Lyotard has suggested in 
The Inhuman, is a futile exercise.13 So we could call to mind here films 
like The Matrix and Surrogates - in which the human body has been ren-
dered obsolete or fully subservient to machines yet nevertheless must be 
introduced either as mental projection (in the case of  The Matrix) or as 
surrogate – a robot designed to replicate one’s own physical body or to 
provide a preferable alternative.
The tension between subjectivity which extends beyond the physical 
limitations of  the body and the continued primacy of  such a body in con-
ceptions of  the self  highlights what cultural theorist Jeffrey Nealon has 
referred to as an ‘intensification’ in power or power relations.14 Since iden-
tity and subjectivity cannot be reduced to purely embodied experience nor 
can they take place entirely in hyperreality – both modes of  existence and 
identification call upon one another to supplement, provide substantiation 
13 Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1991).
14 Jeffrey Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and its Intensifications Since 1984 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).
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of  or offer commentary upon the other. The GPS on our phone tells us 
where we are and Facebook or other social media provides a narrative or 
commentary on this. Yet, as obvious as this might seem, in order to do so 
we also need to exist in concrete space. We need a physical location and 
not simply an IP address.
Nevertheless, it is possible to note here a conceptual shift occurring 
in emphasis from disciplinary modes of  power to Foucault’s notion of  
security in terms of  circulation drawing upon the idea of  a world popu-
lation as fluid or in flux. Whether as a result of  forced or chosen migra-
tion, whether we decide to take a vacation or are obliged to flee civil war 
and natural disaster, it seems that we are no longer defined in terms of  
the fixed space or territory we inhabit but in terms of  a displacement 
which is either validated or denigrated. Each individual might thus be 
conceived in terms of  a trajectory, what Paul Virilio calls a ‘trajectivity,’ a 
line drawn between points as opposed to a point intersected by a series 
of  lines.
What this skewed perspective fails to take into account is what hap-
pens at the borders? In the detention camps? What is at stake in our refer-
ence to certain spaces as ‘non-places’ following the work of  Marc Augé? 
Such a designation puts us at an ironic remove from these spaces, consti-
tuting an unconvincing refusal of  the role they play in controlling and reg-
ulating our experience but also this allows us to ignore other non-places, 
the margins or edges, the excesses of  biopolitical society. These are the 
spaces where death, disease, violence and crime occur not as a result of  
failures or gaps in a society’s disciplinary apparatus but in order to affirm 
the necessity of  such apparatus. In this respect, security and disciplinary 
power are even more intertwined than Foucault implies. One of  the clear-
est examples of  this is the nation state building that goes hand in hand 
with free market circulation.15
So in other words, what I am proposing here is a return to Foucault’s 
notion of  anatomo-politics defined as follows:
centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of  its 
capabilities, the extortion of  its forces, the parallel increase in its usefulness and 
its docility, its integration into systems of  efficient and economic controls, all 
15 On this see Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala, Hermeneutic Communism: From 
Heidegger to Marx (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011).
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this was ensured by the procedures of  power that characterized the disciplines: an 
anatomo-politics of  the human body.
Such an anatomo-politics, it seems to me, continues to function 
as a fundamental dimension of  the biopolitical, even as contemporary 
readings and problematisations of  the biopolitical found in the work of  
Agamben and others, have resulted in a richer, more complex understand-
ing of  Foucault’s original definition here. 
Therefore, to return to disciplinary power is not to deny the systemic 
deterritorialisation which has occurred since WWII through the reorgan-
isation of  individuals into migrant workers whereby labour-forces are no 
longer bound by nations or territories. At the same time, archetypal forms 
of  institutional power the factory, hospital, school or prison and their aus-
tere architecture seem to have disappeared from certain skylines or con-
verted into expensive residential and office property, its original signage 
providing a misplaced palimpsest of  nostalgia. Yet, if  disciplinary power 
ceases, in some places, to crystallise within a fixed space, henceforth of  a 
different density, fragmented and dispersed through a city’s infrastructure 
via a complex multi-layered empire of  signs and surveillance, elsewhere, 
such institutions not only still dominate the horizon but do so not as relics 
of  a bygone era but, rather, as the new constructions bringing together 
the latest techniques and technologies for the control and management 
of  individual bodies. In addition to maximum security prisons and bor-
der restrictions, within the same context, we might also think about the 
distribution centres run by Amazon in the UK and Europe which employ 
various tracking devices to ensure maximum productivity by workers in 
completing orders and other tasks.
By returning our focus to the disciplinary, I also want to suggest here 
that there are certain bodies that matter in theory and, more importantly, to 
theory, that end up producing frustrating binaries which fail to change the 
terms in which we think about such bodies or groups of  bodies. Moreover, 
there are some bodies that are necessarily excluded from such discussions 
precisely because they do not ‘fit’ certain critical agendas. Here, I want to 
focus on the ‘criminal’ body but precisely in terms of  the body of  the one 
who has committed a crime rather than with recourse, at least initially, to 
the more ubiquitous processes of  criminalization and securitization which 
might be argued to apply to all of  us in some way or other. 
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Dangerous Acts
In reasserting how more attention needs to be paid to the real bod-
ies in real spaces of  Foucault’s anatomo-political, it is necessary to look 
at the criminal qua law-breaker rather than simply as the transgressive, 
subversive, troubling other. This is not to suggest that all those who find 
themselves incarcerated are guilty of  breaking the law but, rather, to ex-
plore and expose the workings of  the system which defines criminality as 
such. The criminal ‘identity’, the criminal ‘subject’ can only be produced 
as such as long as there is a founding set of  laws to adhere to and conse-
quently break.
In her critique of  the ‘indefinite detention’ applied to suspects as 
part of  the U.S. ‘war on terror’, Butler structures her analysis around the 
absence of  any trial or, indeed, any empirical evidence that those be-
ing detained had committed the ‘dangerous acts’ that U.S. government 
intelligence claimed they had the potential to commit.16 But what of  the 
notion of  a ‘dangerous act’ in itself ? Where Butler accurately identifies 
a link between the suspension of  the justice system and its functioning 
via the relationship between trial and sentence, she gives less attention to 
the definition of  a dangerous act except to problematize the very delib-
erate inability of  Rumsfeld and Cheney to adequately articulate exactly 
what the Guantanamo detainees were supposed to have done. Thus, in 
evoking the absence of  dangerous acts or, at the very least, absence of  
any concrete proof  of  such acts, Butler fails to address what should or 
should not happen in the case such acts did occur and can be proved. 
This seems to be something of  a blind spot which risks endorsing a legal 
and penal system which requires further critique both in itself  and in its 
relationship to extra-legal, military procedures carried out both on U.S. 
soil and abroad.
To further explore the question of  the ‘dangerous act’, the follow-
ing quotation is taken from French prison director, Olivier Maurel’s 2010 
autobiography:
We keep [nous gardons] in our prisons those who burgle your houses and steal 
your cars, those who sell drugs to your children and friends, those who sexually 
assault or rape your daughters, your mothers, your sisters and your cousins, those 
16 Butler, Precarious Life, pp. 77ff.
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who steal your money and those who murder and kill people you know and care 
about. We keep those who abduct, rape then murder young children. We keep 
those who plant bombs and want to destroy, for political and religious reasons, 
the very essence itself  of  our civilization, our long shared, democratic, republi-
can history.17
Who exactly is Maurel addressing here? Coming at the end of  his ac-
count of  life as self-professed ‘taulier’ [jailer], this exhortation reads as an 
act of  special pleading, a last ditch attempt to gain public sympathy and 
approval through a warning issued to any reader tempted to side with the 
inmates over and above those charged with keeping them locked up. The 
‘nous’ [us] and ‘vous’ [you] are bound together through a ‘shared history’ 
which is under threat from an homogenous ‘ceux qui’ [those who], where-
by those in incarceration are reduced to a list of  violent and vindictive 
crimes. This is a hyperbolic reminder that those serving prison sentences 
are a direct menace to the well being of  both the reader and his or her 
family and friends. In play here is a straightforward politics of  fear intended 
to legitimate the penal system and those running it.18 There is also an as-
sumption in his evocation of  certain acts, most notably paedophilia and 
terrorism, that the reader will acquiesce with the incarceration of  those 
having committed them without any further questioning of  the social 
structures producing and defining such acts in the first place. Moreover, 
Maurel defines such a system as beyond recrimination, positing it in terms 
of  a civilization, a republic and a democracy. 
Maurel’s outburst runs counter to most of  his narrative which is pre-
dominantly taken up with showing what a reasonable, decent guy he is, 
sympathetic to the needs and problems of  his inmates even when they 
are holding him hostage. Thus, if  we are to take anything from the text, 
it must be that Maurel does not and cannot see things in black and white 
but, rather, recognizes the inherent failure of  the penal system and his role 
in it here. This is why he is right, perhaps unwittingly, to present this to 
us as a ‘confession’ despite largely reading as a series of  self-aggrandizing 
‘war stories.’ To present the inmates in terms of  a select list of  crimes 
17 Olivier Maurel, Le Taulier: Confessions d’un directeur de prison (Paris: Fayard, 2010), 
my translation.
18 Angela Davis has identified a ‘politics of  fear’ as a deep-rooted ideology working 
to legitimize the existence and development of  prisons in the U.S. in Are Prisons Obsolete? 
(Open Media, 2003), p. 16.
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is the only means of  perpetuating the logic of  incarceration, presenting 
those locked up as a direct threat to individual safety and freedom. Again, 
this is the reemergence of  a sovereign notion of  life within the biopoliti-
cal presented as a direct attack by one population upon another. Foucault 
touches on the notion of  the ‘biocriminal’ and the link between racism 
and criminality at the end of  ‘Society Must Be Defended.’19 Although he refers 
only to the ‘execution’ or banishment of  the criminal body here, there is 
scope for a rereading here which, drawing on the work of  Angela Davis, 
considers the systemic racism of  the prison.
What Maurel’s text demonstrates is the difficulty of  thinking life with-
out prison. Where it has come to constitute his entire raison d’être since 
he passed the ‘fonctionnaires’ [public service] exam, the idea of  conceiv-
ing of  society without prisons, detention centers and other ‘secure units’, 
is something we all find deeply complex and unsettling. In Are Prisons 
Obsolete? Angela Davis provides a good explanation of  the way in which 
discussions of  ‘decarceration’ and ‘abolition’ are precluded via a primary 
focus on prison reforms.20 To focus one’s attention on ‘reforming’ the car-
ceral space ultimately endorses that space and its structural logic, contrib-
uting to a call for bigger and more ‘efficient’ prisons. Davis is not suggest-
ing those fighting for improved prison conditions should cease to do so. 
Rather, such a fight should work alongside an ongoing debate about the 
role of  prison within society based around abolition as a genuine rather 
than utopian possibility. Such a debate requires an analysis which looks 
at how today’s prisons constitute an integral part of  the social fabric and 
economic system of  a country. As Davis points out, a critique of  today’s 
industrial prison complex cannot be predicated on a reformist rhetoric.21 
In an interview given in the 1970s, Foucault posed a similar problem:
You want me to describe a utopian society where there would be no prison. 
The problem is to know if  we can imagine a society in which groups themselves 
controlled the application of  rules. It is the whole question of  political power, 
the problem of  hierarchy, of  authority, of  the state and state apparatuses. It is 
only when we have cleared away the brushwood from this immense problem that 
19 Michel Foucault, ‘Society Must Be Defended’: Lectures at the Collège de France. 1975-76 
(London: Penguin, 2003), p. 258.
20 Ibid., p. 20.
21 Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete?, p. 100.
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we will finally be able to say: yes, we should be able to punish this way, or, it is 
completely useless to punish, or again, society ought to give such a response to 
this irregular conduct.22
In particular, specific attention needs to be paid to this idea of  ‘dan-
gerous’ acts which functions to legitimate keeping people locked up as 
a means of  ‘protecting’ those outside. To focus on ‘acts’ in this way is a 
faulty premise. If  followed to its logical conclusion it ends up mattering 
little whether someone has actually committed an act or simply is deemed 
to be capable of  doing so. Moreover, in linking the abolition of  slavery to 
the development of  prison labour, Davis has highlighted the way certain 
acts and activities such as vagrancy became penal offences precisely to 
assure the continuation of  slavery albeit in the guise of  ‘hard labour’ and 
the chain gang.
In the immediate aftermath of  slavery, the southern states hastened to de-
velop a criminal justice system that could legally restrict the possibilities of  free-
dom for newly released slaves. Black people became prime targets of  a develop-
ing convict lease system, referred to by many as a reincarnation of  slavery.23
Indeed, the racialization of  certain crimes like shooting, drug use as 
‘black crimes’ continues today with widely divergent sentences handed out 
to black and white adolescents and young men (and women) for the same 
drug misdemeanors. Again, the ‘potential’ or even the appearance of  having 
the potential to commit ‘dangerous’ acts by dint of  the colour of  one’s skin 
played out in the case of  Trayvon Martin in 2012 which resulted in the 
acquittal of  George Zimmerman, his killer, deemed by the jury to have 
the right to such ‘profiling’ in the name of  personal protection according 
to Florida State’s Stand Your Ground statute.
Yet, despite her focus on the absence of  the act rather than its exis-
tence, elsewhere in Precarious Life, Butler is also sensitive to the ‘conditions’ 
which make certain acts possible. She writes:
[W]e need to situate individual responsibility in light of  its collective condi-
tions. Those who commit acts of  violence are surely responsible for them; they 
22 Michel Foucault, ‘Prisons et révoltes dans les prisons’, in Dits et écrits II, pp. 425-432.
23 Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete?, p. 29.
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are not dupes or mechanisms of  an impersonal social force by agents with re-
sponsibility. On the other hand, these individuals are formed, and we would be 
making a mistake if  we reduced their actions to purely self-generated acts of  will 
or symptoms of  individual pathology or “evil.” But the discourse of  individual-
ism and of  moralism (understood as the moment in which morality exhausts 
itself  in public acts of  denunciation) assume that the individual is the first link in 
a causal chain that forms the meaning of  accountability.24
In pinpointing the need to radically rethink the relationship between 
conditions and acts, Butler is warning against a simplified reading of  such 
conditions which drastically limits the agency of  certain individuals as a 
result of  their specific, personal circumstances in favour of  an analysis 
which considers the conditions of  existence which are systemic in the 
oppression and exclusion of  certain groups. This also works to provide a 
link between actively committing certain ‘dangerous’ acts and passively al-
lowing other dangerous acts to take place. Furthermore, in her discussion 
of  the ‘frame’ in Frames of  War, which we will return to later, she provides 
a more nuanced recognition of  how no act possesses an inherent moral or 
ethical value but, rather, is defined as such within a given context, in turn 
providing the ‘context’ for identifying individuals and groups in relation to 
such acts. ‘Some way of  organizing and presenting a deed leads to an in-
terpretive conclusion about the deed itself.’25 At the same time, the analysis 
needs to be pushed further still. Butler does little to circumvent the idea 
that certain acts should always be punished or that punishment should as-
sume some form of  imprisonment. Thus, perhaps what is needed is not 
simply an insistence on the ‘presence’ of  dangerous acts in order to detain 
or imprison someone, but a radical critique of  how acts are presented as 
more or less ‘dangerous’ depending on who is committing them.
Therefore, although I want to eschew a lengthy discussion of  the re-
lationship between the legal, the political and the cultural which define 
the terms and conditions of  existence within a given society for differ-
ent sets of  individuals, I do want to draw attention to the way in which 
the criminal act continues to function as a kind of  degree zero in public 
consciousness and as such continues to legitimize prison in terms of  both 
24 Butler, Precarious Life, pp. 15ff.
25 Judith Butler, Frames of  War: When if  Life Grievable? (London and New York, NY: 
Verso, 2010), p. 8.
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retributive punishment, rehabilitative treatment and public security rather 
than in terms of  the warehousing of  unwanted, unneeded labour. 
Without rejecting Butler’s concepts of  ‘grievable’ and ‘precarious’ 
lives outright since these might also be applied to how we perceive those 
in incarceration as well as those suspended in ‘indefinite detention’ or the 
unnamed, unseen casualties of  a never ending war – I want to propose 
the notion of  the ‘intolerable’ which structured the GIP’s enquiry into 
the state of  prisons in France in the 1970s as a means of  more effec-
tively bringing together those in a position to tolerate or refuse to toler-
ate something, academics and activists primarily, and those for whom 
existence is ‘intolerable.’
The notion of  the ‘intolerable’ raises the question as to what is con-
sidered to be ‘intolerable’ and by whom. On the one hand, that prisons 
were and, indeed still are, intolerable is taken as a starting point by the GIP. 
Yet, the aim of  the project was to discover what exactly it was about them 
that was ‘intolerable.’ In an interview given in 1971, Foucault defined the 
problem as follows:
Simply put, I perceive the intolerable. The blandness of  the soup or the 
coldness of  winter is relatively bearable. But to imprison an individual just be-
cause he has a run-in with justice, that is unacceptable!26
Such a statement makes it clear that Foucault thought that prison re-
forms were not enough. Butler’s references in Precarious Life to the metal 
sheet standing in for a roof  in Guantanamo (p.73) perhaps miss the point 
here. The specific material conditions are deplorable. Foucault is not con-
testing that the food served in prisons is disgusting. As Butler makes clear 
in Bodies that Matter, to fixate on the material body without considering the 
structures of  power which define such materiality or put it to use in this or 
that way is a meaningless exercise which simply endorses existing hierar-
chies based on archaic biological assumptions about gender and race. The 
same applies to the material conditions in a prison. As indicated above 
following Davis’ position, too much focus on specific material aspects of  
prison life risk affirming the prison system per se. Instead, what is required 
is to take these conditions as a start not end point in order to recognize the 
various technologies of  power underpinning these conditions.
26 Michel Foucault, ‘Je perçois l’intolérable’, interview with G. Armledet (July 1971), 
reproduced in Dits et écrits I: 1954-75 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), pp. 1071-1073.
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This is also why further attention needs to be focused on the criminal as 
the body we are all complicit in defining as such rather than the merely ‘trou-
bling’ body. I want to suggest a reading which engages with Butler and spe-
cifically the notion of  performativity but which at the same time provides a 
critique of  the parameters which, for one reason or another, have resulted 
in a privileging of  certain ‘other’ bodies. Women – Homosexual – Muslim. 
Victim – Deviant – Terrorist. Perhaps all three. Such bodies, I would sug-
gest, are ‘docile’ even when at their most dangerous or volatile. Even, more-
over, when they enact a necropolitics such as are embodied by the extreme 
eating disorders of  Schiavo and others, HIV ‘bugchasers’ or suicide bomb-
ers. Bodies which function largely as illusory threats, constructed as spectral 
doubles (as much by the intellectual left as the moral majority right) to the 
equally fictional image of  the U.S. citizen as white, Christian, male and het-
erosexual. Yet, at the same time, such transgressive bodies are ‘docile’ even 
when the threat is real precisely because they have come to embody an ‘ex-
ceptionalism’ which serves to maintain and reaffirm the status quo.
Butler’s Repressive Hypothesis
One of  the main difficulties faced by academics working in the hu-
manities and social sciences, is how to respond both accurately and ad-
equately to current and recent events particularly when those events call 
into question established and comfortable categories of  thought and 
frameworks. Knee jerk polemics to the order of  intellectual journalism 
should be avoided as should the over-abstraction of  unfolding events. In 
his work on prisons, Foucault was attentive to these problems as well as 
to the complex relationship between his role as academic and his involve-
ment in what he called ‘political action.’
If  I occupy myself  with the GIP, it is only because I prefer effective work 
to university yacking and the scribbles of  books. To write a sequel today to my 
Histoire de la folie, one that would cover material up to the present era, is devoid of  
interest to me. On the other hand, a concrete political action in favour of  prison-
ers appears to me charged with meaning. An aid in the struggle of  detainees and, 
ultimately, against the system that puts them in prison.27
27 Michel Foucault, ‘Le grand enfermement’, in Dits et écrits I, pp. 1164-1174.
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Despite his indictment of  such ‘scribbles’, Foucault’s subsequent 
written account in Discipline and Punish of  how incarceration became the 
dominant form of  punishment in Europe during the eighteenth century is 
far more nuanced as a negotiation between current events and the socio-
historical conditions and discourses underpinning these. In pointing out 
that what he is effectively writing is a ‘history of  the present’,28 Foucault 
is also making a statement about the role of  the academic in contradis-
tinction to that of  the activist. Discipline and Punish not only intentionally 
avoids direct references to the work of  the GIP and the accounts of  those 
who responded to the enquiry but at the same time issues a warning about 
the traps of  conflating sustained intellectual reflection and direct political 
action. As a result, the ‘respectful’ distance established between the work 
of  the GIP and the publication of  Discipline and Punish also results in a text 
which benefits from the more sophisticated analysis of  disciplinary power 
that came to distinguish Foucault from Althusser and other Marxist phi-
losophers working on institutional forms of  power at the time.
If  the Gulf  War of  the early 1990s was the first fully ‘mediatised’ 
war then the Iraq War of  the early 2000s saw another layer of  reflexivity 
added here via an almost instant commentary on the images and reports 
circulating and saturating public consciousness which as a result of  the in-
ternet occurred on a rolling basis rather than punctuated by programming 
schedules. A 24-hour meta-commentary. As W.J.T. Mitchell points out in 
Cloning Terror, ‘Every history os really two histories. There is the history of  
what actually happened, and there is the history of  the perception of  what 
happened.’29 If  philosophers and scholars have always provided commen-
tary on world events, after 911 the need and pressure for academics to do 
so has intensified in unprecedented ways. At the same time the role and 
responsibility of  the academic as representative of  the increasingly priva-
tized industrial university complex has come under further scrutiny. If  engage-
ment with a more public audience is encouraged (in the UK this is known 
as ‘impact’), there is increased policing as to what one might say in public.
This is Butler’s contention, reporting in Precarious Life on the way in 
which discussion and debate was shut down after 911 within the university 
28 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: Birth of  the Prison (New York, NY: Random 
House, 1977), p. 31.
29 W.J.T. Mitchell, Cloning Terror: The War of  Images, 9/11 to the Present (Chicago, IL: 
The University of  Chicago Press, 2011), p. xi.
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as much as outside its confines. Yet, if  the shock and horror in the imme-
diate aftermath of  the attacks on the World Trade Center, made academics 
wary of  jumping to quick conclusions and critical of  those amongst them 
who did, surely intellectual engagement with these issues was not repressed 
but actually proliferated here? Moreover, academics (especially in the U.S.) 
were forced to acknowledge the relationship between their research, their 
politics as well as their personal affiliations which previously could have to 
a large extent co-existed unproblematically and unquestioned. 
Looking at Precarious Life with the benefit of  a decade of  further re-
flection and critical distance, it is possible to read Butler’s response to 
what she views as a critical impasse in two ways. The first is to read it 
as a straightforward attempt to redress the refusal of  colleagues to think 
beyond the images of  the World Trade Center collapsing, in which any 
vague invitation to consider the wider conditions and implications of  this 
attack was countered with accusations of  anti-Semitism. Alternatively, we 
might read Butler’s own extensive commentary on this as evidence that 
debate and discussion were effectively being pursued in academic circles 
but that with the ‘first world complacency’ previously enjoyed by academ-
ics severely shaken, the possibility for polite disagreements was no longer an 
option. In this respect, Butler seems to be evoking her very own ‘repres-
sive hypothesis’ in relation to the intellectual discourse surrounding 911. 
Foucault sets up the ‘repressive hypothesis’ in the opening chapter 
of  The Will to Knowledge. Playing on a longstanding ‘myth’ of  Victorian 
prudery and repression, Foucault taps into our assumptions that dis-
cussions of  sex and sexuality were precluded in Victorian society and 
that in the late twentieth century, we were just beginning to ‘liberate’ 
ourselves from the constraints imposed on sexual discourse and activ-
ity during the nineteenth century. Here, Foucault performs a sleight of  
hand in which he confirms what we think we know precisely in order to 
pull the rug out from under us. Drawing our attention to the multiple 
discourses, theories, prescriptions and instructions about sex emerging 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Foucault forces us to think 
again about this notion of  repression. Essentially, he is calling us to look 
at what is there rather than what we are told is there. In this sense, he 
is continuing his critique of  discourses and the conditions which make 
certain statements possible and acceptable where others are inadmis-
sible that we find in The Order of  Discourse. 
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I would like to propose we carry out a similar reading of  the discours-
es, images, theories and commentaries produced since 911 in relation and 
response to the ‘war on terror.’ To some extent, such a reading follows the 
trajectory established by Mitchell in Cloning Terror but would focus instead 
on the discourses rather than the images which have saturated public and 
academic consciousness. Moreover, if, as Mitchell suggests, the reign of  
a certain type of  ‘image’ of  terror ended with Obama’s inaugural election 
campaign,30 the same does not hold true of  the discursive frameworks 
which continue to operate according to certain logics, most notably, that 
of  the exception.
If  Butler’s response in Precarious Life often seems to consist of  a 
straightforward exercise in self-validation, I don’t think there is much mile-
age in simply denouncing this as an act of  ‘bad faith’ on her part. Instead, 
we might ask where the merits of  such an exercise in justifying one’s own 
position lie? Is there another way to read Precarious Life, particularly the 
most personal passages which would focus on it as an archive, document-
ing a specific moment in an intellectual history as much as a political one? 
Moreover, would Butler’s analysis of  precarious and grievable life have the 
same potency or function if  they were untethered from her accompanying 
narrative on the state of  affairs in U.S. academia? To try to respond to such 
tensions, it might be useful to look in more detail at what might be termed 
an academic discourse of  exceptionalism emerging in the wake of  911.
Suspended State
A particularly vociferous example of  academic discourse on 911 might 
be easily identified in the writing of  Slavoj Žižek. In his comments on the 
shifting paradigms of  Western biopolitics, Žižek is a useful interlocuteur 
here and his statement from Welcome to the Desert of  the Real is particularly 
telling in this respect:
Who is really alive today? What if  we are ‘really alive’ only if  we commit 
ourselves with an excessive intensity which puts us beyond ‘mere life’? What if, 
when we focus on mere survival, even if  it is qualified as ‘having a good time’, 
what we ultimately lose is life itself ? What if  the Palestinian suicide bomber on 
30 Ibid., p. 2.
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the point of  blowing him – or herself  (and others) up is, in an emphatic sense, 
‘more alive’ than the American soldier engaged in a war in front of  a computer 
screen against an enemy hundreds of  miles away, or a New York yuppie jogging 
along the Hudson river in order to keep his body in shape?31
If  Žižek is calling into question a Western biopolitics which has emp-
tied all political commitment out of  life and living, he is also constructing 
a (deliberately) problematic binary composed of  easy clichés. While his 
readings of  911 might, along with much of  his writing, seem reactionary 
not least in the speed with which they followed events themselves – the 
book of  essays also marks a watershed and seems to define the stakes, if  
not for Western politics and culture, then certainly for left-wing intellec-
tual readings of  identity and culture over the past decade and a half. Thus, 
when he suggests that the claims circulating post 911 that nothing would ever 
be the same again, were disingenuous, intended to maintain life as usual for 
the average American – he both missed the mark and succeeded in defin-
ing it. As it turns out nothing will ever be the same again politically, culturally 
or intellectually.
What has followed has been an obsession with the ‘exceptional’ body. 
The academic gaze reproducing the repulsed fascination with which the 
world, and more specifically, the U.S. and Europe consumed images and 
narratives of  torture and abuse in Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and elsewhere 
by armed forces representing a free and democratic West. Yet, in focusing 
on the ‘exception’, to what extent has this succeeded in endorsing the sys-
tematic oppression of  other bodies? More specifically, if  Butler and others 
have focused their efforts on certain instances of  precarious life, certain 
images of  torture – what of  those who fall outside the exceptional spaces 
and moments which emerged into public consciousness after 911? What 
of  those existing in spaces which are also marginal, exclusionary spaces but 
at the same time fully integrated into a society, or section of  society, not 
subject to martial law or enacting a ‘state of  exception’? While Agamben 
asserts that the law functions precisely via its suspension, its inoperativity 
constituting both its suspension and fulfillment, this is not what is going 
on in today’s penal system. The law with all its niceties, predilections and 
pathologies is to all intents and purposes functioning as ‘normal’ here.
31 Slavoj Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of  the Real (London and New York, NY: Verso, 
2002), p. 88.
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In other words, those serving time in San Quentin, Attica or Colorado 
are not the ones the bombs missed. There are now over 2.2 million incarcer-
ated in the U.S., a total of  0.7% of  the population.32 Incarceration has be-
come a form of  warehousing, which, with the introduction of  the ‘super 
max’ has led to more not less incarceration for increasingly long periods 
of  time. As Davis and others have indicated, this form of  incarceration 
is not unique to the U.S. but is being adopted by other Western countries 
faced with an increasing prison population.
To Have Done with the Docile Body
All this leads me to propose that we have done with the ‘docile’ bod-
ies which shape much contemporary theorizing of  otherness focusing in-
stead on the criminal other who has committed acts of  violence towards 
others. This is not a question of  endorsing or trivializing such acts but, 
rather, suggesting that the association of  certain crimes and ultimately all 
crime with imprisonment is something we continue to take for granted 
and which often underpins (and undermines) the challenges we pose to 
other forms of  detention and exclusion. 
Consequently, what is implicit in Butler’s work, especially Precarious 
Life but, as I will also demonstrate, Frames of  War, is the call for a complete 
rethinking about both conditions of  existence and the terms of  repre-
sentation which determine, legitimize and perpetuate such conditions. If  
the parameters of  her own discussion are predicated on the supra-legal, 
the exceptionalism of  Guantanamo as opposed to the regularity of  San 
Quentin or Attica, I would argue that she sets the scene for a deeper analy-
sis of  the conditions which produce the criminal body and then demand 
his or her incarceration.
Firstly, how might Butler’s in-depth analysis of  ‘indefinite detention’ 
be applied to a penal system, such as we find in the U.S., which largely re-
fuses any discourse of  ‘rehabilitation’, preferring instead to view inmates 
as bodies to be managed? To what extent does Clinton’s Three Strikes rule 
meting out life sentences for repeat offenders embody this notion of  de-
tention in the absence of  concrete acts? If  the Guantanamo detainees 
32 As of  2011. Data available: http://prisonstudies.org.
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had not committed any ‘dangerous’ acts but simply were deemed capable 
of  contributing to their planning and execution in no matter how small a 
way, the three strikes rule, also uncouples a specific, concrete crime from 
an ‘appropriate’ punishment by focusing on a notion of  criminality based 
on repeat offences, no matter how minor. Drawing again on the complex 
relationship between individual responsibility and the conditions structur-
ing such responsibility, as highlighted by Butler, we can see the extent to 
which the three strikes rule is both a tacit acknowledgment of  this rela-
tionship and a direct attempt to deny its existence.
Secondly, what is the scope for mapping Butler’s work on gender onto 
the space of  the prison? One of  the main dangers in ongoing discussions 
of  gender within the carceral space concerns the way in which sociologi-
cal research carried out on the different experiences in male and female 
units along with statistics about crime and gender end up reaffirming tra-
ditional gender hierarchies and binaries via the statements such studies 
make about how men and women interact with members of  their own 
gender within certain spaces. It is possible to see how such findings are 
predicated on an underlying assumption that prison is the de facto mode of  
punishment if  not for everyone then, at the very least, for the heterosexual 
male ‘offender.’ 
The stakes are twofold here, on the one hand, what is required is a 
questioning of  exactly how the architecture, infrastructure and organiza-
tion of  the prison works to produce rather than simply affirm certain norma-
tive gender divisions and constructions. Secondly, such arguments must 
be used to develop the abolition debate rather than limited reforms which 
themselves are often implicated in the reinforcement of  gender norms 
rather than their critique.
If  the prison is a space which produces as much as it affirms existing 
hierarchies, how are such productions or performances of  gender and 
criminality as well as race and class mapped back on to the space outside 
the prison? In the next section, I want to explore the tension between 
what might be referred to as a saturation of  images of  incarceration via 
the mainstream media and, most notably, the U.S. prison documentary 
over the past decade and, at the same time, the ongoing absence of  other 
images of  incarceration.
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How to Take a Photograph of  the Frame
The notion of  the frame, the parergon, as expounded upon by Jacques 
Derrida in The Truth in Painting, seems to lend itself  particularly well to 
exposing the tensions and paradoxes of  the carceral space. A space which 
is both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. A space subject to multiple acts of  fram-
ing in the carving up of  space and time. Cells, blocks, wings. Mealtimes, 
visiting hours, recreation, lights out. There is also the double meaning of  
framing which is not lost on either Derrida or Butler. To frame someone 
not only means to place them in a certain context but also to set them up. 
Regardless of  whether one is ‘guilty’ of  a certain act or not, an inmate is 
both contextualized and set up within the frame, or frames of  the prison. 
So, to what extent are we, as viewing public, complicit in such setting up? 
In Frames of  War, Butler poses the question as to the possibility of  ‘photo-
graphing’ the frame and what this might mean. I want to propose two pos-
sible examples with which to explore this framing of  the frame: Foucault’s 
opening account of  torture in Discipline and Punish and television entertain-
er Louis Theroux’s Behind Bars documentary. Then I will suggest how we 
might identify challenges to such acts of  framing emerging from within 
the space of  the prison itself.
The spectacle of  surveillance
If  the GIP succeeded in getting ‘ordinary’ (rather than intellectual or 
political) prisoners to produce their own narratives, there was still a lack 
of  visual representation of  incarceration in France excluding the stock 
footage, which up until today mostly consists of  empty prison corridors 
or aerial views authorized by the prison authorities. Before going on to 
explore the saturation of  images of  incarceration that defines public con-
sciousness of  the U.S. penal system, I want to explore the absence of  the 
prison image in other contexts as counterpoint to such saturation.
The absence of  an image is no longer a straightforward form of  ex-
clusion or repression. Today we can also note a deliberate framing of  
the absent or deferred image. Perhaps the most obvious example of  such 
framing is the photo of  ‘The Situation Room’, the image of  senior White 
House staff  gathered around to watch video footage of  the capture and 
killing of  Osama Bin Laden by Seal Team Six. But is that what we are ac-
tually looking at? As it transpired, the photo that was so widely circulated 
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could have been taken at any point during the screening of  what was no 
doubt hours of  special ops footage. So why was the picture taken and cir-
culated at all? If  the image is deferred once then it is deferred again in the 
uncertainty that the moment captured corresponded to the precise mo-
ment of  Osama bin Laden’s death. This is a double absence which includes 
or contains precisely via the gesture of  excluding. A radical inversion has 
occurred in which it is the technique of  surveillance itself, and not that 
which is being surveilled or monitored, that now constitutes the spectacle. 
This is something I think we might explore further via Foucault’s account 
of  the spectacle of  torture in Discipline and Punish.
Foucault’s much cited account of  Damiens versus the prison time-
table continues to be one of  the most powerful, if  hyperbolic, accounts of  
the penal system in Europe. Attempts to paraphrase often fail to do justice 
[sorry] to the poetry of  his graphic description. Moreover, I would argue 
that where frequently references to this opening passage within larger dis-
cussions of  power, penal systems and the criminal body do not necessarily 
tell us anything new or different, there might be a more interesting way of  
reading these acts of  citation and paraphrasing. What is it about the open-
ing passage which is so appealing and which works so well? What is the 
function of  the image of  punishment rendered as narrative. Is this a case 
of  transforming the reader into another spectator alongside those in the 
crowd watching Damiens being torn into pieces? Or, is there an injunction 
here to distinguish reader from spectator?
Furthermore, how do we then relate this opening to the plates in the 
middle of  the text, a question raised by François Boullant in Michel Foucault 
et les prisons. Foucault never includes actual images in his texts except in Ceci 
n’est pas une pipe. This is not to say he does not provide accounts of  images 
such as Las Meninas in The Order of  Things but key here as with the account 
of  Damiens is the image rendered as narrative. Unlike Deleuze, Foucault 
does not even seem to be a fan of  the diagram. Again these only appear in 
Ceci n’est pas une pipe. The image plates in Discipline and Punish are therefore 
important. Why are they there? And, how do they affect our reading of  
Discipline and Punish?
In the GIP’s call for prisoners, former prisoners and their families 
along with all those involved in the penal system – lawyers, social workers 
and education officers to speak up and out about prison life – a supple-
mentary call went out for those involved in facilitating the project to col-
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lect as much other information including photos. At the time there was a 
paucity of  images documenting prison life in France. The idea of  filming 
within and around the prison was, at that point, also posited but as a pos-
sible but ambitious and distant prospect for the group.
Written in the aftermath of  this concrete work on the current prison 
system in France, Discipline and Punish should be read as both emanating 
from Foucault’s active engagement and as a sustained reflection on the 
way in which techniques of  discipline and normalization are engrained 
within contemporary society, how such techniques harness space and time 
in specific ways and capture both the criminal, deviant and the docile, 
law-abiding bodies. Foucault himself  insisted that the book should not 
be read as shameless intellectual profiteering, the recuperation of  the cur-
rent or recent suffering of  those incarcerated and their families in order 
to produce philosophical reflections. Acknowledging these as a starting 
point for his enquiry, Foucault demonstrates how one might be sensitive 
to both events and the individuals they affect whilst at the same time rec-
ognizing the necessity for sustained analysis concerning how one arrives 
at this point. How have we arrived at the specific forms and levels of  the 
intolerable experienced throughout the world today?
Foucault’s account of  Damiens should be read as deliberately affec-
tive. Not only to emphasize our assumptions about changes in methods 
of  punishment but at the same time in order to draw attention to the role 
narrative plays and should continue to play as well as perhaps to alert 
us to the way in which we, scholars, students, are so easily seduced by 
such instances of  the ‘intolerable.’ Thus, where Foucault’s opening pas-
sage is a rhetorical device, the stakes operate on two levels. Yes, unsettle 
our presumptions about the apparent ‘humaneness’ of  modern forms 
of  punishment namely incarceration. But, at the same time, call us to ac-
count for the way we revel in being unsettled in a way that is often coun-
terproductive, narcissistic, metadiscursive and thus which rarely results in 
concrete action.
Similarly, the relish with which those of  us working with and on 
Foucault seize these descriptions and leaf  through the pages in the middle 
of  the book attests, I think, to the return and persistence of  the spectacle 
even whilst Foucault is making the case for its disappearance. What is dif-
ferent, however, is how such a space, the space of  the spectacle, is framed 
and contained. The public spectacle of  torture and execution became the 
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very site where sovereign power was subverted and contested rather than 
affirmed making it a volatile space privy to mob rule. A more complex, re-
fracted process is at work today in which surveillance has itself  become a 
spectacle exemplified in television shows like Gogglebox in the UK in which 
viewers watch the same families watching prime time television each week. 
But also the U.S. prison documentary. Mob rule is co-opted here as a 
self-disciplining, self-regulating force. The watchtower is no longer a con-
crete architectural structure within a specific disciplinary institution but, 
instead, has moved inside the home, diffuse yet neatly contained within 
the space of  the TV or computer screen.
Shock Photography
If  the visual imagery of  Foucault’s accounts of  punishment are, in 
fact, deflections or deferrals, shifting our focus away from the modern 
day, contemporary prison precisely in order to expose its foundations and 
workings, such imagery is also an attempt to ‘capture’ the processes of  
‘framing’ at work in our perception of  incarceration. Writing on ‘shock 
photography’ in Mythologies, Roland Barthes points out that the photogra-
pher has been ‘shocked’ precisely so we don’t have to be. Judgments have 
been made on our behalf  and the terrible image of  atrocity neutralized, 
our potential for action exhausted in the moment of  looking without re-
ally seeing. As obvious as such a statement might now seem, this does not 
make it any less relevant with regards to the framing processes at work in 
contemporary prison documentaries. Such techniques of  representing life 
in incarceration continue to perpetuate a politics of  fear even as we openly 
acknowledge the sensationalism at work. Moreover, the regularity with 
which U.S. penitentiaries like San Quentin feature in such documentaries 
means that the presence of  film crews within the carceral space is some-
thing which is accepted as commonplace by inmates as well as correctional 
officers. Thus, in a similar way to Charcot’s use and development of  pho-
tography in the diagnosis of  various forms of  madness and hysteria in 
La Salpetriere, the role of  the film crew within the U.S. penal system has 
become both complicit and essential in diagnosing and ‘framing’ different 
forms of  criminality.
In particular this pertains to the way in which those incarcerated are 
actively encouraged to perform a certain criminality. This plays out, for 
example, in the carnivalesque performance of  normative gender roles (for 
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example, husband and wife couplings) in San Quentin prison as filmed 
for Locked Up together with the seemingly more ‘intelligent’ and ‘sensi-
tive’ framing of  Louis Theroux’s Behind Bars (BBC, 2008). One approach 
here might be to apply Butler’s reading of  the film Paris is Burning in Bodies 
that Matter, to the performance of  gender in prison. Where it is possible 
to locate the desire of  characters like Venus in Paris is Burning to conform 
to both the ideal of  woman and the domesticity such an ideal facilitates 
within a complex series of  exclusions pertaining to both class and gen-
der, the performance of  femininity in prison by those who would define 
themselves as homosexual males in the outside world attests to a differ-
ent form of  ‘passing.’ The complex, paradoxical notion of  the ‘natural’ 
as something which takes considerable time and effort to achieve under-
goes a certain inflection in prison. If  Venus risked her life (and indeed 
Butler suggests that this was probably what lead to her death shortly after 
the film was made) in trying to ‘pass,’ individuals like those interviewed 
by Louis Theroux in San Quentin, acknowledge that the performance of  
femininity in jail is regarded as a form of  ‘honesty’ rather than deceit 
about one’s identity. If  this leaves one open to certain abuses, it also makes 
things ‘smoother’ as one inmate puts it since it neutralizes the subversive 
threat of  the dominant homosexual male, rendering him as woman. It is 
also interesting to note how such performances engender couplings be-
tween openly homosexual and otherwise heterosexual men (often married 
on the outside). This appears to be more than a simple rationalization 
of  homosexuality by otherwise ‘straight’ males or indeed a replication 
of  traditional hierarchies and power relations between a ‘male’ and ‘fe-
male’ couple. Theroux’s documentary is largely taken up with observing 
the different social configurations and relationships produced within San 
Quentin, navigating between discussions with gang members and former 
members and those in romantic relationships in prison. A former member 
of  a Nazi, white supremacist gang, now in a relationship with a gay Jewish 
inmate, offers some insight into the way both gangs and couples provide 
a certain type of  exclusive friendship and loyalty deemed necessary to 
survive in prison not simply physically through protection form harm in 
the case of  gangs or the fulfillment of  desire in the case of  a romantic 
relationship but also in order to feel special and included in a space in 
which one is both excluded from society and subject to the homogeneous 
routine of  the prison.
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By setting up this link between gang affiliation and coupling, Theroux 
provides a way of  thinking differently about gang membership and gen-
der within the space of  the prison, attesting to the persistence of  values 
such as friendship, trust and loyalty as opposed to the usual discourses of  
racism, homophobia and violent power structures applied to both sets of  
relationships. Nevertheless, in his conversations with Deborah, a pre-op 
transvestite, a different link is set up between criminality and homosexual-
ity, that of  recidivism. Deborah’s enthusiasm for her new younger partner 
is tempered by a certain resignation which comes from having been ‘doing 
this a long time.’ She is both referring to her life in and out of  prison and 
the type of  relationships both inside and out that accompany her recidi-
vism. When asked why she has been in and out of  jail for the past twenty 
years, Deborah suggests it is as a direct consequence of  the men she hangs 
out with. If  Deborah is the one who ‘sets up’ the link between criminality 
and sexuality, it is Theroux’s line of  questioning which makes this possible 
and which allows such a connection to stand unchallenged.
Theroux’s more nuanced form of  ‘framing’ might be supplemented 
with other more conventional (here read ‘sensationalist’) examples of  pris-
on documentary and the various techniques employed ranging from the 
pixelated faces and distorted voices of  ‘at risk’ inmates to the positive de-
pictions of  the correctional officers via certain scenes and narrative con-
ventions. Yet, if  both inmate and CO, at least in certain well-documented 
U.S. penitentiaries, have become accustomed to performing their roles of  
criminal and guard for the benefit of  public consumption, what about 
other forms of  representation and, more specifically, self-representation 
of  those incarcerated elsewhere? 
Conclusion: Towards a Tactics of  Counterveillance
It is possible to carry out a reading in which all forms of  representa-
tion necessarily involve a certain performativity which ends up affirm-
ing those incarcerated as criminal or deviant. Even when possibilities of  
‘positive’ self-representation arise such as the Koestler Foundation’s ini-
tiatives to fund and disseminate art produced in prisons and by those in 
secure units in the UK, these often lack sustained critical reflection as 
to the underlying role of  such projects. While the myth of  rehabilitation 
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such projects ascribe to is surely preferable to the notion of  managing or 
‘warehousing’ bodies that is openly acknowledged by those both work-
ing in and incarcerated in the U.S. penal system, a more direct link might 
be made between documentary images and those produced by inmates 
themselves. To what extent do both serve to perpetuate a certain exoti-
cism of  the ‘dangerous’ other, contained within the frame of  the tele-
vision screen or housed in a respectable art gallery or museum for the 
purposes of  our safe, comfortable consumption? The dirty politics of  
fear of  most prison documentaries is underpinned by the same logic as 
the heartwarming, emancipatory tale of  the inmate turned artist. Both 
suggest that prison works, that prison is necessary and that it is the best 
place for those being kept there.
However, in evoking the hidden similarities between the different 
myths of  criminality and the way these are framed outside of  the prison, I 
am calling for a more critical discussion of  these myths and their perpetu-
ation rather than shutting down further the possibilities for such criticism. 
Thus, by way of  conclusion, I want to focus on the potential for self-
representation within the space of  the prison as series of  tactics which re-
sist as much as conform to established notions of  criminality. Borrowing 
Michael Welch’s notion of  ‘counterveillance’ which he uses to describe 
the work of  the GIP in getting prisoners to find their own ‘voices,’ how 
might we begin to identify a tactics of  counterveillance operating within 
and beyond the space of  the prison?33 Here, we might also look at the al-
ternative systems of  communication set up within the space of  the prison 
by inmates in the form of  kites and yoyos. The complex codes used in 
kites, tiny pieces of  paper containing detailed information on gang poli-
tics, wrapped up and swallowed for safe keeping, demonstrate a form of  
literacy and communication which defies the oft-quoted statistics about an 
illiterate prison population. 
Another example is the use of  smuggled mobile phones by inmates to 
produce their own ‘filmed’ testimony about life in prison. One such film 
was made in Europe’s largest prison, Fleury-Mérogis in France, in 2008 
before being shown on French news show Envoyé Spécial. Filming inside 
French prisons continues to be heavily regulated in contradistinction to 
the saturation of  images emerging from U.S. prisons. The poor technol-
33 Michael Welch, ‘Counterveillance: How Foucault and the Groupe d’information 
sur les prisons reversed the optics’, Theoretical Criminology 15:3 (August 2011), pp. 301-313.
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ogy and editing of  the self-made ‘reportages’ risks rendering these into 
pure novelty. Nevertheless, I would argue that they constitute important 
documents not so much as a result of  their content but in their contesta-
tion of  who gets to decide on the limits of  the frame.
Thus, we have moved from the complex relationship between the 
‘dangerous’ act and the conditions which led to such an act being com-
mitted to the issue of  a different agency. The agency of  those incarcer-
ated in defining and producing their own mode of  self-representation. 
If  Manning’s decision to enter the space of  the U.S. military prison as a 
woman embodies one such instance of  this, the awareness of  how gender 
must be performed differently within the carceral space acknowledged by 
the inmates of  San Quentin seems to affirm this. The anatomopolitics of  
prison life, does not simply define the criminal as criminal through various 
processes of  framing or subjectivisation. Today, the inmate is not simply 
complicit in his or her own ‘framing’ but is deeply, painfully aware of  such 
complicity and the impossibility of  refusing to comply. 
Moreover, I would argue that if  Butler has identified the importance 
of  the frame as an object of  analysis in thinking through the circulation 
and censorship of  images of  torture, more attention is needed to the way 
in which Butler sets up her own frame of  reference here. The frame is at 
once inside and outside, part of  the image and part of  the background. In 
the instance of  a window frame – what is inside and what is outside? It is 
easy to reverse the binary here. The same applies to the prison, the ‘inside’ 
which is both ‘outside’ of  society, located at its edges yet a central, integral 
part to its everyday functioning. What is needed here is to consider fur-
ther the way in which the frame keeps inside and outside apart, the global 
and the local, the international and the domestic enabling the mutually 
endorsed, uncontested legitimation of  the intolerable as both exceptional 
and everyday occurrence.
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This essay enacts a return to the notion of  the anatomopolitical which constitutes 
one of  the main focuses of  Foucault’s work on discipline, power and knowledge. 
If  much academic discourse on power and control has, in recent years, tended to 
focus on the biopolitical defined as the management of  populations and groups 
rather than the specific physical conditions of  individual bodies, the role of  disci-
plinary institutions, the school, the factory or workplace, the hospital and the pri-
son continue to embody a disciplinary form of  power identified by Foucault as 
emerging in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. If  the biopolitical has been 
reconceived by Butler, Agamben and others as predicated upon the exception, 
what of  these spaces which continue to maintain the status quo underpinning such 
an exception? Here, I will consider the space of  the prison as, first and foremost, 
an interior rather than exterior space, in order to unpack, critique and develop 
Butler’s work on indefinite detention, dangerous acts and processes of  framing. 
The central tenet here is that more attention on the domestic, the anatomopoli-
tical and the everyday is required in relation to the international, the biopolitical 
and the exceptional. At the same time, I will consider the complex role of  the 
public intellectual in speaking on and about current political events.
Keywords: Foucault, Butler, Indefinite detention, Anatomopolitical, Biopolitics, 
Prison, Criminality.
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